

The Critique of Pure Reason, is the main philosophical work of Immanuel Kant

The Critique of Pure Reason, is the main philosophical work of Immanuel Kant, was published in 1781, the result of rapid writing after years of thought. Before its creation, Kant reported that it was no longer possible to keep such complex material in his head and that it urgently needed to be recorded.

“Pure,” according to Kant, means “free from experience.” In order not to get confused in the text, experience must be understood in two meanings: 1) as the data of our sensations and 2) as a method of multiple (experimental) checks. Further we will talk about experience in the first meaning, we will say about the second meaning separately.

Accordingly, a “pure mind” is a mind to which nothing is taken from experience. The basis of such a mind is our own cognitive abilities, which only process signals coming from outside, but they themselves are not formed thanks to them. “So, metaphysics fell back into the same old worm-eaten dogmatism” (Kant 2)

“Criticism,” in turn, means that we must find out the structure of cognitive abilities that make up pure mind, and show the boundaries of these abilities: what they can and cannot do.

Kant calls *aesthetics* the doctrine of sensuality (*feelings*). With the help of feelings, things are given to us. But feelings are different. The perception of cold, heat, sweet, sour and a million other impressions are a posteriori or empirical feelings. They are experienced by different people in different ways, and we can always imagine a world in which everything sweet or sour has disappeared.

But there are also a priori or transcendental feelings (or, more correctly, *forms of sensuality*). We have only two of them: *space* and time. They are experienced equally by all people, and with all the efforts we are not given to imagine the world outside of time and space (to make sure of this, it is worth trying to do it).

By analogy with the solution of the problem of space, Kant also solved the question of time. Space and time are not objective characteristics of the world, but those fundamental structures of the sensuality of the subject itself, which form the world of objects of our experience. Until our sensory impressions are properly designed, a person cannot perceive anything. Just as we do not distinguish colors or sounds of a certain threshold value, a person cannot distinguish anything in the world until he passes signals from the world through a priori forms of time and space. Kant calls analytics the doctrine of reason. Reason is the means by which things are thought. Along with a priori forms of sensuality, we also have a priori formed of reason. They allow you to streamline and explain all the possible logical operations of our thinking. They can be divided into four large subgroups: operations with quality, with quantity, with relationships and with modality. Whatever material comes to us, our thinking will operate with it in one of the logical ways described in the subgroups. For example, in order to think of an event, we must also think that it necessarily has a cause and is capable of certain consequences. In making a judgment, we always either affirm or deny something. We must also determine the modality: the event must only happen; already happened or is just about to.

Meditations on First Philosophy by Descartes

Meditations concerning the first philosophy, where one demonstrates the existence of God and the real distinction between the soul and the body of man ". René Descartes allows a dizzying leap to modern philosophy: metaphysics, ontology and physics will be permanently upset. Here is a summary of these Metaphysical Meditations. Descartes first looks back on his years of study. Like all pupils and students, he acquired in his youth quantities of knowledge which he then considered to be certain. But to learn is not to know. With the passing of the years, it turned out that some of this knowledge turned out to be false due to the progress of the sciences, which, on the other hand, struck all the knowledge. Now, on uncertainty, nothing can be built. Descartes could have stopped there and concluded with the Skeptics that the human mind cannot reach any certainty, that our knowledge is relative to what we are and that in matters of absolute truth it is wiser to suspend its judgment. Descartes examines all the ideas that he finds himself having in his mind: he notes in particular the idea of the infinite, of which man cannot be the author; this idea which, in fact, exceeds us, is the tangible sign of a reality, which itself exceeds us, of God. The certainty of God is therefore the second of our true knowledge.

On the contrary, he decides not to be satisfied with this uncertainty and to make a clean sweep of the past once , to start all over again and rebuild the edifice of science on solid foundations. The time has therefore come for him to accomplish the task he has set for himself. The conditions are now favorable: On the one hand he has completed his training and has the intellectual maturity which will allow him to carry out his project, because it is a risky business in which it is not a question of committing to the slight. If he did not succeed in carrying out his enterprise, the consequences would be disastrous for the whole knowledge; on the other hand, settled in Holland, he enjoys the tranquility and solitude essential to the work of thought. The first Meditation is entirely devoted to the test of doubt. For Descartes, doubt is the prerequisite for

any undertaking of philosophical and scientific construction. From the very idea of God, his omnipotence and his goodness, the philosopher will deduce the veracity of all our natural knowledge: sensitive (relating to the perception of the world) and even sensory (perceptions of our body). What Descartes Calls “Innate Ideas” Beyond the precepts laid down by Descartes, it is a method, that of doubt, which will mark the history of philosophy.

The characteristics of methodical doubt. Doubt is voluntary: Unlike the Skeptics who suffer doubt, Descartes voluntarily chooses to doubt. From now on we are no longer in the register of observation, but in that of action and combat: all prior knowledge must be destroyed. Doubt is methodical: it is rigorous and controlled and obeys two precise rules. Descartes takes it as a rule to consider as false everything which, however little, is not absolutely certain and certain.

Wanting to test the value of each of our knowledge would take too long and would in any case be impractical. To achieve its objective, Descartes decides to attack the very foundations of our knowledge.

Ethics Demonstrated in Geometrical Order by Spinoza

" Ethics Demonstrated in Geometrical Order “the main work of Spinoza - is divided into five parts: I. About God; II. About the nature and origin of the soul; III. On the origin and nature of affects; IV. About human slavery or about the forces of affects; V. About the power of the mind or about human freedom. These titles require purely mathematical knowledge, which, according to Spinoza, has the character of an ordines geometrical demonstrate (provable in geometric

order). In other words, this is the science of strictly mathematical knowledge. This kind of science, according to Spinoza, should be ethics, and not just physics or astronomy, optics or medicine. It is called to be a science of all things, i.e. metaphysics. And it is called ethics, because it justifies the proposition that human actions underlie cognition, and his very behavior is crucial for any means of knowing the truth as such. Descartes did not pay attention to the importance of human behavior for the sake of knowing the truth. But Hobbes already said that a person can only know what he himself is capable of accomplishing. Cognition turned out to be the main form of human activity. Thus, the identification of truth with action took place, and cognition itself turned out to be a construction. In the Middle Ages, all this was considered only as a characteristic of the divine mind and knowledge. The principle of activity after the Renaissance became the main one in the new European consciousness. This principle highlighted the idea of some autonomous subject, sovereign in its acts of thinking and judgment. In other words, this kind of subject of thinking and judgment bases its behavior on independent acts that have only its source as its source. No biased grounds, no external authorities in the field of thinking, judgment and behavior are allowed. Everything stems only from the activity of the subject, justifying itself. As soon as such a subject turns out to be a human being, acquiring a kind of self-sufficiency, then nothing can be included in his judgments about God, the world and himself, what would not have arisen from his own activities; those. Neither external authority, nor tradition as such, nor divine revelation itself can be a measure and a condition for independent human activity. This kind of activity begins with an independent act of thinking, i.e. Ego cogito (I think) Descartes. All that I, as an independent subject, say about God, the world, and man, all this must pass through my autonomous communication with everything that exists. At the same time, it is assumed that neither in the being of God, nor in the world as such, nor in

any being, there is any alien instance in relation to my activity as a thinking subject, I as a thinking creature can learn and thereby master everything. That is why Spinoza said that to know the truth is to be aware of the causes and foundations of all that we know. Statements about all things go along with those foundations that are established and realized by the subject himself, and not given to him, say, by divine revelation. We only truly know what we can recognize and reproduce in our own activity. Thus, the principle of activity is the basic rule of rationality. This rule was based on the assumption of a reasonable structure of the world, which implied the existence of a pre-established harmony, on which all Leibniz metaphysics was built.

In *the New Essays on Human Understanding*, in which he answers word for word to *L'Essaide* Locke, Leibniz specifies his thought: the knowledge of the essayist is undoubtedly clear and distinct, it however remains simply empirical (gold resists the cup and strong water, II 31) and cannot be said to be rational. It is therefore necessary to distinguish degrees in distinct knowledge, according to whether it is unfulfilled or inadequate (the criterion of distinction is only a superficial mark, and unrelated to the nature of the thing) or accomplished or adequate (it is by the exhaustive knowledge of its essence that the object can then be distinguished from any other

Leibniz to give an example of aesthetic knowledge (colors, smells, flavors), clear because I definitely identify the red color, or the acid flavor, without however being able to state the determinations which induce these qualities. We must therefore distinguish between perception - capable of clearly recognizing its object - and apperception - capable of enumerating its distinct determinations. This confused clarity of aesthetic knowledge comes from the fact that it implies the infinity of the universe, which our finite knowledge cannot explain. It is thus, according to an example that Leibniz likes, that I hear the sound of the wave without yet discerning the noise of

each of the drops of water that compose it: "As I walk on the shore of the sea, and hearing the great noise it makes, Principles of nature and grace. And the sound of each wave melts in the continuous rumor of the sound of the sea in the distance, as well as in the sensation of green inseparably mix yellow and blue: "So, looking at a mixture of fine yellow powders and blue, we perceive a green color; however, we do not feel anything other than very finely mixed yellow and blue, although we do not notice it and rather imagine ourselves to be something new "(Leibniz 5).



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